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Introduction

The United States has a long tradition of measuring income poverty and weighing the
effectiveness of government policies aimed at poverty reduction. While this analysis has been of
value to policymakers, it rests on a foundation that is inherently parochial, for it is based on the
experiences of only one nation. The estimation of cross-nationally equivalent measures of
poverty provides an opportunity to compare United States poverty rates and the effectiveness of
American antipoverty policy with the experiences of other nations. The Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS) database contains the information needed to construct comparable poverty measures
for about two dozen countries. It provides data that allow a comparison of the level and trend of
poverty across several nations. In this paper we use cross-national comparisons made possible
by the LIS to examine America’s experience in maintaining a low poverty rate. We compare the
effectiveness of United States antipoverty policies to that of similar polices elsewhere in the
industrialized world.
If lessons can be learned from cross-national comparisons, there is much that can be
learned about antipoverty policy by American voters and policymakers. The United States has
one of the highest poverty rates of all the countries participating in the LIS, whether poverty is
measured using comparable absolute or relative standards for determining who is poor.
Although the high rate of relative poverty in the United States is no surprise, given the country’s
well-known tolerance of wide economic disparities, the lofty rate of absolute poverty is much
more troubling. After Luxembourg, the United States has the highest average income in the
industrialized world. Our analysis of absolute poverty rates provides poverty estimates for 11

industrialized countries. The United States ranks second highest among the 11 in per capita
income, yet it ranks third highest in the percentage of its population with absolute incomes below
the American poverty line. The per capita income of the United States is more than 30 percent
higher than it is, on average, in the other ten countries of our survey. Yet the absolute poverty
rate in the United States is 13.6 percent, while the average rate in the other ten countries is just
8.1 percent— 5.5 percentage points lower than the United States rate. Our paper suggests some
reasons for this pattern.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by reviewing international concepts and
measures of poverty as they relate to the main measures of income and poverty used in other
chapters of this book. Next we present cross-national estimates of both absolute and relative
poverty, concentrating on the latter measures. After examining the level and trend in these rates,
we explore some of the factors that are correlated with national poverty rates and examine the
antipoverty effectiveness of government programs aimed at reducing poverty. We conclude with
a discussion of the relationship between policy differences and outcome differences among the
several countries, and consider the implications of our analysis for antipoverty policy in the
United States.

Cross-National Comparisons of Poverty: Measurement and Data

Differing national experiences in designing and implementing antipoverty programs
provide a rich source of information for evaluating the effectiveness of alternative policies.
Policymakers in most of the industrialized countries share common concerns about social
problems such as population aging, widening wage disparities, family dissolution, and poverty.
The availability of information from a number of countries makes it possible for us to compare

2

the experience of one country to the experiences of others. This comparison can shed light on
our own situation and help us understand the successes and failures of United States policy.
While poverty measurement is an exercise that is particularly popular in the Englishspeaking countries, most rich nations share the Anglo-Saxon concern over distributional
outcomes and the well-being of the low-income population. Few West European nations
routinely calculate low income or poverty rates, however. Most recognize that their social
programs would ensure a low poverty rate under any reasonable set of measurement standards
(Björklund and Freeman 1997).1 While there is no international consensus on guidelines for
measuring poverty, international bodies such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),
the United Nations Human Development Report (UNHDR), the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Statistical Office (Eurostat), and the
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) itself have published several cross-national studies of the
incidence of poverty in recent years. The large majority of these are based on LIS data.2

Measurement
There is considerable informal agreement on the appropriate measurement of poverty in a
cross-national context. Most of the available studies share many similarities that help guide our
research strategy here.

• For purposes of international comparisons, poverty is almost always a relative
concept. A majority of cross-national studies define the poverty threshold as one-half
of national median income. In this study, we use both 40 and 50 percent of median
income to establish our national poverty lines. We select 40 percent of national
median income as our relative poverty threshold because it is closest to the ratio of
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the official United States poverty line to median United States household (pre-tax)
cash income (42 to 43 percent in 1998 and 1994).3

• Only a handful of cross-national studies use an absolute poverty line, but to permit
comparisons with other papers in this volume, we begin with one such definition. To
estimate absolute poverty rates in different countries, researchers must convert
national currencies into units of equal purchasing power or “purchasing power parity”
(or PPP) exchange rates for the currencies (Summers and Heston 1991). Construction
of an absolute poverty threshold that is consistent across countries is problematic,
because national poverty rates are sensitive to the purchasing-power-parity exchange
rate that is chosen. Moreover, PPP exchange rates were developed to permit accurate
comparison of gross domestic product across countries rather than incomes or
consumption of lower income households. This means that, even though PPP’s are
appropriate for comparing national output or output per capita, they are less
appropriate for establishing consistent income cutoff points for measuring poverty. 4

• Poverty measurement is based on the broadest income definition that still preserves
comparability across nations. The best current definition is disposable cash and
noncash income (that is, money income minus direct income and payroll taxes and
including all cash and near cash transfers, such as food stamps and cash housing
allowances, and refundable tax credits such as the earned income tax credit (EITC).5,6

• For international comparisons of poverty, the household is the single best unit for
income aggregation. It is the only comparable income-sharing unit available for most
nations. While the household is the unit used for aggregating income, the person is
the unit of analysis. Household income is assumed to be equally shared among
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individuals within a household. Poverty rates are calculated as the percentage of all
persons who are members of households with incomes below the poverty line.

• A variety of equivalence scales have been used in cross-national comparisons in order
to make comparisons of well-being between households with differing compositions.
Equivalence scales are used to adjust household income for differences in needs
related to household size and other factors, such as the ages of household members
(see previous chapter). In the United States poverty literature, a set of equivalence
scales is implicit in the official poverty lines. The official poverty threshold for a
four-person family is twice as high as is the poverty line for a single person who lives
alone. In order to make our cross-national absolute poverty estimates consistent with
the official United States poverty rate, we use the official American poverty line
scales in these analyses. For the cross-national analysis of relative poverty rates,
however, we use a different scale, which is much more commonly used in
international analyses. After adjusting household incomes to reflect differences in
household size, we compare the resulting adjusted incomes to either the 40 or 50
percent of median poverty line. The equivalence scale used for this purpose, as in
most cross-national studies, is a single parameter scale with a square-root-ofhousehold-size scale factor.7

Database
The data we use for this analysis are from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database,
which now contains almost 100 household income data files for 25 nations covering the period
1967 to 1997 (LIS Quick Reference Guide 2000). We can analyze both the level and trend in
poverty and low incomes for a considerable period across a wide range of nations. In computing
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the trend of relative poverty, we have selected 19 nations for which at least two years of
observations are available for the period spanning 1979-1997.8 The 19 countries are the largest
and richest in the world and include all of the G7 nations, Scandinavia, Canada, Australia, and
most of Europe.9 We also include all of Germany, including the eastern states of the former
German Democratic Republic (GDR) in many of our analyses.10

Results: Level and Trend in Poverty

We have calculated three sets of poverty rates, one absolute and two relative. In addition
to overall poverty rates, we separately estimated poverty among two vulnerable populations,
children and the aged.11 Finally, we tabulated the trends in relative poverty for as many rich
nations as the data permit.

Absolute Poverty
All poverty measures are in some sense relative and must be chosen to be appropriate for
the context in which they are used. The World Bank defines poverty in Africa and Latin
America using an income threshold of $1 or $2 per person per day, and in Central and Eastern
Europe a threshold of $2 or $3 per day (Ravallion 1994, 1996). In contrast, the absolute United
States poverty line is 6 to 12 times higher than these standards. The World Bank poverty
thresholds are obviously too low for use in OECD countries. Scandinavian countries and
Eurostat have “minimum income standards” that are as high as 60 percent of median national
incomes in Europe. This would translate into a poverty standard that is roughly 25 to 30 percent
higher than the official United States poverty line, depending on the average standard of living of
a particular European country (European Community 2000; Eurostat 2000).
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We begin our analysis by comparing the United States household poverty rate to absolute
poverty rates in other nations using the United States poverty line, which is now about 42 percent
of United States median household income. For a variety of reasons, the number of countries for
which we can estimate absolute poverty rates is smaller than the number for which we can
estimate relative poverty rates.
One limitation in estimating cross-national absolute poverty rates is that incomes in each
country must be translated into a common currency using PPP-based “exchange rates.” Our
estimates of absolute poverty are based on a single set of PPP exchange rates, those developed
by the OECD for 1994 or 1995. These are close to the most recent OECD base year (1996) for
estimating such exchange rates (OECD 2000). This limits our calculations to those OECD
nations for which we have 1994 or 1995 LIS data.12 We use the OECD estimates of PPP
exchange rates to translate household incomes in each country into United States dollars. The
measure of household income we use is LIS-adjusted disposable income, which includes cash
and some near cash income (including food stamps and the EITC) but subtracts income and
payroll taxes. We also use the equivalence scale implicit in the official United States poverty
thresholds. Because our definition of income differs from that used by the U.S. Census Bureau,
the absolute poverty rate we calculate for the United States in 1994 (13.6 percent) is somewhat
below the Bureau’s estimate of the official poverty rate in that year (14.5 percent).
The OECD’s estimates of PPP exchange rates are far from ideal for comparing the wellbeing of low-income households in different countries. In principle, the PPPs permit us to
calculate the amount of money needed in country A to purchase the same bundle of consumption
items in country B. If relative prices on different consumption items differ widely between the
two countries, however, the PPP exchange rate may only be correct for one particular collection
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of items. The exchange rates calculated by the OECD are accurate for overall national aggregate
consumption (Castles 1996). Thus, the exchange rates are appropriate for comparing market
baskets of all final consumption, including government-provided healthcare, education, and
housing. These goods are paid for in different ways in different nations, however. In most
countries, health care as well as some rental housing, childcare, and education are subsidized
more generously by the government than is the case in the United States. Thus, disposable
incomes in countries with publicly financed health and higher education systems reflect the fact
that health and education costs have already been subtracted from households’ incomes (in the
form of tax payments to the government). One implication is that in countries where in-kind
benefits are larger than average, real incomes may be understated and therefore absolute poverty
rates may be overstated because citizens actually face a lower effective price level than is
reflected by OECD’s estimates of the PPP exchange rate. The opposite is true for those counties
whose citizens must pay larger amounts for health care and education out of their disposable
incomes. Since the United States provides lower than average amounts of noncash benefits,
United States absolute poverty rates are likely understated.13 In contrast, Northern European
countries provide high levels of tax-financed health care and education benefits and their
absolute poverty rates are likely overstated. However, the extent of these differences is unknown
at this time.14
Another problem for comparing poverty rates across countries arises because of
differences in the quality of the household income survey data used to measure poverty. For
example, the LIS survey for the United States is the Current Population Survey (or CPS). The
CPS captures about 89 percent of the total household incomes that are estimated from other
sources (national income accounts data and agency administrative records). Most, but not all, of
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the other surveys used by LIS capture approximately the same percentage of total income
(Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995). The household surveys of the Scandinavian
countries capture between 93 and 94 percent of the incomes reflected in the aggregate statistical
sources, while the Australian survey captures just 83 percent of the total. Unfortunately, not all
countries have performed the calculations that would allow us to determine the overall quality of
their household survey data. We used a rough methodology to compare the quality of survey
data for the different LIS countries. Only those countries with LIS household surveys that
captured a large percentage of national income are included in our comparisons of absolute
poverty rates.15,16
Assuming that the household surveys from different countries yield information about
disposable incomes with comparable reliability, we should expect that once incomes are
converted into a common currency unit, those countries with higher average incomes will have
lower absolute poverty rates. This expectation is based, of course, on the presumption that
income inequality is approximately the same across all countries. If income inequality differs
significantly, countries with higher average incomes but greater income disparities may have
higher poverty rates than low-income countries and indeed this is the case.
The results in Table 1 indicate a wide range of absolute poverty rates across the 11
nations, ranging from a low of 0.3 percent in Luxembourg to a high of 17.6 percent in Australia.
The unweighted average poverty rate for the 11 countries is 8.6 percent. The United States has
the third highest poverty rate (13.6 percent), ranking behind only Australia and the United
Kingdom. The table also shows real PPP-adjusted GDP per capita for 1995. Since Australia and
the United Kingdom have per capita aggregate incomes that are, respectively, about 23 and 33
percent below that of the United States, the higher absolute poverty rates in those two countries
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should hardly be surprising. However, nearly all of the countries in Table 1 have a per capita
income level that is below that of the United States, ranging from 67 percent of the United States
level (in the United Kingdom) to 84 percent (in Norway). Only tiny Luxembourg has an average
aggregate income per capita of 31 percent above that in the United States (OECD 2001). And as
expected, Luxembourg has the lowest absolute poverty rate. Most of the other countries have
absolute poverty rates substantially below that in the United States, despite their lower real per
capita incomes.
Based on this table, it seems clear that amongst these rich nations, the distribution of
income is as important as its average absolute income in determining its level of poverty. Poor
countries can have lower poverty rates than rich ones if their income distributions are
compressed; rich countries can have higher poverty rates than poor ones if their incomes are very
unequally distributed.17
While acknowledging that the United States has greater inequality than other
industrialized nations, many defenders of American economic and political institutions argue that
inequality plays a crucial role in creating incentives for people to improve their situations
through saving, hard work, and investment in education and training. Without the powerful
signals provided by big disparities in pay and incomes, the economy would operate less
efficiently and average incomes would grow less rapidly. In the long run, poor people might
enjoy higher absolute incomes in a society where wide income disparities are tolerated than in
one where law and social convention keep income differentials small. According to this line of
argument, wide income disparities may be in the best long-term interest of the poor themselves.18
In recent years the Australian, the United Kingdom and especially the United States
economies have in fact performed better than other economies where income disparities are
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smaller. Employment growth has been faster, joblessness lower, and economic growth higher
than in many other OECD countries where public policy and social convention have kept income
disparities low. For low-income residents in these three countries, however, the theoretical
advantages of greater inequality have failed to produce rapidly growing incomes over the past
couple of decades. Their absolute incomes are below the incomes that poor people receive in
other rich countries that have less inequality. As a result, the absolute poverty rates in these
three countries are substantially higher than they are elsewhere in the OECD. The supposed
efficiency advantages of high inequality have not accrued to low-income residents of the United
States, at least so far. To the extent such advantages exist, they have been captured by
Americans much further up the income scale, producing a conspicuously wide gap between the
incomes of the nation’s rich and poor.

Relative Poverty
In order to broaden the range of countries in our analysis and to compare poverty as it is
commonly measured in cross-national studies, we now examine relative poverty rates. A range
of relative poverty standards is used in cross-national comparisons. One-half of national median
adjusted income is the most commonly used poverty threshold for international comparisons. In
fact, it is hard to find a study that does not use this standard (see note 2). But other standards are
also used, if for no other reason than for sensitivity tests. In Europe, the European Statistical
Office (Eurostat) has recommended a 60-percent-of-median standard for measuring poverty and
social exclusion (Eurostat 2000). In this paper we concentrate mainly on the 40-percent-ofmedian line because of its proximity to the United States poverty line, though we also provide
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poverty estimates using a threshold of 50 percent of national median income (Appendix
Table A-1).
Relative poverty rates in 19 nations, using both thresholds, are displayed in Figure 1. All
poverty rates are from the early to the middle 1990s. The poverty rate using the lower poverty
threshold varies between 1.3 percent in Luxembourg and 10.7 percent in the United States
(1997), with an average rate of 4.8 percent across the 19 countries. The fraction of people with
incomes below the poverty line is obviously sensitive to where the line is drawn. Even though
national poverty rates are sensitive to the level of the threshold, the ranking of the 19 countries is
affected only modestly by the change in the relative poverty threshold. However, “deep” or
extreme poverty in the United States stands out very clearly even when the poverty threshold is
set at 40 percent of median income. At this threshold, almost 11 percent of the Untied States
population is poor, more than are below the 50-percent threshold in 13 of the other nations
shown. More poor people in the United States suffer from extreme relative poverty than is the
case in other high-income countries (see Table A-1).
Overall national poverty rates using the 40-percent-of-median-income standard fall into
several distinct categories (see Table 2). The United States rate is clearly the highest at 10.7
percent in 1997. Two Anglophone nations— Australia and Canada— plus Italy and Japan have
somewhat lower rates, ranging between 6.6 and 8.9 percent. Three other nations— the United
Kingdom, Spain, and Israel— have still lower rates. The remaining 11 nations— most of Central
Europe and all of Scandinavia— have the lowest poverty rates, below the 4.8 percent overall
average rate.
Higher poverty rates are found in countries with a high level of overall inequality (United
States, Italy), in geographically large and diverse countries (United States, Canada, Australia),
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and in countries with less well-developed national welfare states (Spain, Japan). Low poverty
rates are more common in smaller, well-developed, and high-spending welfare states (European
Community, Scandinavia) and in countries where unemployment compensation is more
generous, where social policies provide more generous support to single mothers and working
women (through paid family leave, for example), and where social assistance minimums are
high.
Poverty rates computed using before-tax-and-transfer household income do not differ
among countries as much as those calculated after taxes and transfers. This finding implies that
different levels and mixes of government spending on the poor have sizable effects on national
poverty rates (Smeeding 1997). In fact, detailed analysis shows that higher levels of government
spending (as in Scandinavia and Northern Europe) and more careful targeting of government
transfers on the poor (as in Canada) produce lower poverty rates (Kenworthy 1998; Kim 2000), a
finding that we verify below. Earnings and wage disparities are also important in determining
poverty rates, especially among families with children (Jäntti and Danziger 2000; Bradbury and
Jäntti 1999; Smeeding 1997). Countries with an egalitarian wage structure tend to have lower
child poverty rates, in part because the relative poverty rate among working-age adults is lower
when wage disparities are small.
Child poverty rates average roughly 0.5 percentage points higher than overall relative
poverty rates (Table 2). But child poverty rates are 4.0 to 5.2 percent higher than are overall
poverty rates in the two countries with the highest child poverty rates (United States and Italy).
Child poverty is also 2.6 points higher than overall poverty in the United Kingdom and 2.9 points
higher in Spain. If poverty is measured using a poverty standard equal to 50 percent of median
national income, Canada also has a notable gap of 3.9 percentage points between child poverty
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and the overall poverty rate (see Table A-1). In contrast, child poverty rates in the low poverty
countries of the European Community and Scandinavia are usually less than or equal to overall
poverty rates. Using the 40 percent-of-median poverty threshold, child poverty in the United
States is 14.7 percent and 14.1 percent in Italy (Table 2). Using the same threshold, child
poverty rates in Scandinavia range between 1.3 percent and 2.2 percent, while in the rest of
Europe they are below 5 percent everywhere except the United Kingdom (8 percent), Germany
(6 percent), and Spain (7 percent).
Child poverty and overall poverty rankings are more similar across countries than are
rankings of poverty among the elderly (see the right-hand columns of Table 2). The aged are the
group that stands in greatest contrast to the others. Using a poverty threshold of 40 percent of
median national income, the elderly on average have a lower poverty rate than other age groups.
A poverty rate for older people above 10 percent is found only in the United States, Israel, and
Australia. Only one other country, Austria, has an aged poverty rate that exceeds 5 percent.
Canada has achieved one of the lowest aged poverty rates, 1.2 percent, far below the rates for
Canadian children and working-age adults.
However, the poverty rate of the elderly is particularly sensitive to the income cutoff used
to determine poverty. While aged poverty rates are on average below the overall national
poverty rate when poverty is measured using the 40-percent-of-median-income standard, they
average 3.0 percentage points higher than the overall poverty rate and 1.7 points above the child
poverty rate when the higher (50 percent of median) income standard is used. Raising the
poverty threshold from 40 percent to 50 percent of national median income increases the
unweighted poverty rate of the elderly from 4.5 percent to 11.6 percent in the 19 countries (see
Table A-1). This increase is the largest of any age group and suggests that social protection
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systems for the elderly often provide income guarantees that are no more than between 40
percent and 50 percent of median national income.
Relative poverty rates can vary across age groups within a nation as much as they do
across nations. Comparing poverty among children and the elderly (Table 2), we find large
imbalances in several nations. Elderly poverty exceeds child poverty by large amounts in
Australia, Israel, and Austria, while the reverse is true in Canada, Spain, Italy, and the United
Kingdom. Poverty is high among both the young and the old only in the United States, 14.7
percent and 12.0 percent, respectively. Child and aged poverty rates are approximately equal in
the other 11 countries, below 6 percent.

Poverty Trends
Evidence on the trend in relative poverty across nations is mixed (see Table 3). The LIS
dataset contains different years of data for different nations over different periods. To determine
poverty trends, we measure changes in poverty rates from a base year (between 1979 and 1981 in
most cases) to a recent year (usually between 1994 and 1997), using the 40-percent-of-medianincome poverty threshold. The table presents the actual change in poverty rates from the first to
the last year. We also rank nations in Table 3 according to their most recent poverty rate
(Table 2) so that we can look for changes in poverty in high- and low-poverty nations.19
If we regard a change of 2.0 points or more in either direction as significant, relative
poverty rates rose significantly between the 1980s and 1990s in Italy, the United Kingdom, and
The Netherlands. Four other countries saw increases of 1.0 to 1.8 points in their relative poverty
rates over the period; only one country, Spain, experienced a modest decline of 1.5 percentage
points. Overall poverty rates changed by less than 1 percentage point in the other nine nations.
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On balance overall, relative poverty rates did not change much between the early 1980s and early
to middle 1990s. Even in The Netherlands, poverty rates rose by 2.3 points to peak at just 4.7
percent in 1994. In some nations, such as the United States, our selection of beginning and end
dates for measuring the trend makes a difference. For instance, in 1979 the relative United States
poverty rate was 10.0 percent, and in 1997 it was 10.7 percent. However, the rate rose sharply in
the early 1980s and again in the early 1990s before falling later in the 1990s.
Different poverty trends are evident for the aged and for children. Among the elderly,
significant declines in poverty rates are evident in eight of the nations studied here, including the
United States. Modest declines can be seen in two other countries (Denmark and Finland). The
poverty rate of the elderly increased significantly only in Australia, while it remained essentially
unchanged in five other countries.
Among children, significant increases in the poverty rate were observed more frequently.
Big increases occurred in Italy (4.6 percentage points), Switzerland (4.1), the United
Kingdom (3.7), The Netherlands (3.8) and Germany (3.3). In the United States the child poverty
rate rose from 13.2 percent to 14.7 percent, though the latter rate represents a steep decline from
1986, when the child poverty rate was 18.6 percent in the LIS dataset. Child poverty remained
largely unchanged in the other 11 countries. Interestingly, child poverty did not fall by a
noticeable amount in any of the nations studied here, with the largest decline a 1.0 percentage
point drop in Sweden.
It is important to recognize that widening income inequality does not always translate
directly into increases in relative poverty rates. In the 1980s and 1990s income inequality rose
dramatically in the United Kingdom and somewhat less in Italy and the United States. Relative
poverty rose at the same time in all three countries. But overall income inequality also increased
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moderately in Norway, Finland, and Israel over this period with no appreciable effect on the
overall poverty rates of these nations (Gottschalk and Smeeding 2000; Smeeding 2000).

Antipoverty Effectiveness of Social Spending for Working Age Households
There are striking differences across countries in the level and configuration of their
social safety nets. It is natural to ask whether differences in social policy lead to systematic
differences in poverty, labor market performance, or income inequality. Table 4 summarizes
market poverty rates and the effects of the transfer and tax system on poverty rates in seven
OECD countries among working age households.20 The pre-tax-and-transfer poverty rate for
household heads aged 25 to 64 is displayed in the first column. Poverty is measured in this
column by comparing the household’s adjusted market income to a poverty cutoff that is equal to
40 percent of each country’s median adjusted disposable income. The “market income” poverty
rates range from a low of 14.9 percent in Germany to 25.0 percent in the United Kingdom. The
next three columns show the effects of social insurance, direct taxes, and antipoverty transfers on
household poverty. In combination, these government interventions reduce relative income
poverty rates for prime-age families by 76 percent to 89 percent in the four European countries
(see the last column in Table 4). That is, the poverty rate measured after tax payments are
subtracted and transfer benefits are included is 76 percent to 89 percent lower than it is when
only gross market incomes are included in household incomes. Market poverty rates are reduced
by 67 percent and 63 percent, respectively, in Australia and Canada. The tax and transfer system
reduces poverty rates for prime-age households by just 37 percent in the United States. Both
social insurance and targeted social assistance contributed to this decline in all of the nations
studied (with the exception of Australia which has only a targeted social assistance system).
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Smeeding and Ross (2001) note there is a positive relationship between the percentage of
GDP spent on social spending and poverty reduction. Sweden and The Netherlands and reduced
market poverty rates by more than 82 percent. Both countries devoted about 14 percent of GDP
to social spending in the years observed here (Table A-2). The United Kingdom and Germany
eliminated more than three-quarters of pre-tax-and-transfer poverty through their tax and transfer
systems, while devoting about 8 to 9 percent of GDP to social spending. Canada and Australia
both reduced poverty by about 67 percent through their tax and transfer systems and spent 6.2
and 8.0 percent of GDP, respectively, on social transfers for the nonaged. The United States
spent less than 4 percent of GDP on these programs, and it reduced pre-tax-and-transfer poverty
by the least proportional amount.

Summary
Both absolute and relative poverty rankings suggest that United States poverty rates are
in the upper end of the range when compared with poverty rates in other LIS member countries.
The United States child poverty rates seem particularly troublesome. In most rich countries, the
child poverty rate is 8 percent or less; in the United States, it is 14.7 percent. Part, though not all,
of the explanation is that the United States devotes a relatively small share of its national income
on social transfers for families with a nonaged head.
The trend in overall poverty between the 1980s and middle 1990s was typically flat,
except in Italy, the United Kingdom, and The Netherlands. No country in our tabulations
experienced a sizable decline in relative poverty over the period examined here. The trend in
aged poverty rates was generally down, but child poverty rates often rose, with significant
increases in five nations.
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Poverty Correlates and Some Policy Lessons for the United States

Poverty and inequality are higher in the United States than in other countries with similar
(and indeed much lower) average incomes (Table 1). American inequality differs noticeably
from that in other rich countries primarily because of differences in relative income levels in the
lower tail of the American income distribution. An American citizen at the 10 th percentile of the
United States income distribution has an adjusted disposable income that is just 34 to 38 percent
of United States median income (Smeeding 2000; Gottschalk and Smeeding 2000). While the
10th percentile income level has drawn closer to the median during the 1990s, it is still five to
seven points lower than in any other nation. 21 Poverty is also higher in the United States than in
other nations. However, owing mainly to the continued strong economy in the 1990s, absolute
poverty rates in the United States are falling back to levels last seen in the 1970s (see also
Freeman paper).
The relative size of the low-income population in the United States is larger than in other
rich countries for two main reasons: low market wages for those with few skills and limited
public benefits. The relationship between the prevalence of workers with low wages and poverty
is highlighted in Figure 2, which shows cross- national estimates of the incidence of overall
poverty and the prevalence of low-paid employment in 14 OECD countries (OECD 1996).22 The
estimates of low-paid employment reflect the percentage of a nation’s full- time workers earning
less than 65 percent of national median earnings on full-time jobs. These estimates refer to the
period 1993-1995 for most nations. The estimates of the overall poverty rate are based on the
40-percent-of-median-income threshold and are taken from the first column of Table 2.
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Figure 2 shows a strong association between low pay and national poverty rates. The
straight line shows the predictions from the regression line of the overall poverty rates on the
incidence of low-paid employment.23 Countries with values above the line have higher poverty
rates than are predicted by the incidence of low relative wages; countries below the line have
lower poverty rates. A substantial fraction of the variance in cross-national poverty rates appears
to be accounted for by the cross-national variation in the incidence of low pay. Because the
United States has the highest proportion of workers in these relatively poorly paid full-time jobs,
it also has the highest poverty rate. On the other hand, Canada has a lower poverty rate than its
unequal wage distribution would lead one to expect. Other countries have a significantly lower
incidence of low-paid employment and also have significantly lower poverty rates than the
United States.
The prevalence of low pay workers is, in fact, not the only reliable predictor of poverty
rates, however. While low pay is a good predictor of the Dutch and Norwegian poverty rates,
other nations with similar overall poverty rates (Canada, the United Kingdom, and Austria) lie
further from the prediction line. Other factors, such as the antipoverty efforts of the government,
are also important predictors of the poverty rate.
Social spending clearly affects the prevalence of poverty. To measure each country’s
antipoverty efforts, we collected OECD statistics on the fraction of gross domestic product
(GDP) spent on cash and near-cash social transfers for the nonaged (including refundable tax
relief, such as the EITC). Measured in this way, social spending is negatively correlated with
national child poverty rates. Figure 3 displays the cross-national relationship between social
expenditures and child poverty rates.24 The solid line in Figure 3 shows the predicted line from a
linear regression of child poverty rates on social spending. As a result of its low level of
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spending on social transfers to the nonaged, the United States has a very high child poverty rate,
even higher than predicted by the regression. As in Italy, the United Kingdom, and The
Netherlands, the United States has more child poverty than predicted by the cross-national
regression equation. Nearly all of the high-spending nations in northern Europe and Scandinavia
have child poverty rates of 5 percent or less.
Even though social spending in general has an inverse correlation with poverty rates,
different patterns of social spending can produce different effects on national poverty rates.
Antipoverty and social insurance programs are in many respects unique to each country. There
is no one kind of program or set of programs that is conspicuously successful in all countries that
use them. Social insurance, universal benefits (such as child allowances), and social assistance
transfer programs targeted on low-income populations are mixed in different ways in different
countries (see Table 4). So, too, are minimum wages, worker preparation and training programs,
work-related benefits (such as child care and family leave), and other social benefits. The United
States differs from most nations that achieve lower poverty rates because of its emphasis on
work and self-reliance for working-age adults, regardless of the wages workers must accept. For
over a decade, United States unemployment has been well below the OECD average, and for
almost three decades American job growth has been much faster than the OECD average. The
strong economy coupled with a few specific antipoverty devices (like the expanded EITC) has
produced most of the United States poverty reduction in recent years.
As long as the United States relies almost exclusively on the job market to generate
incomes for working-age families, changes in the wage distribution that affect the earnings of
less skilled workers will inevitably have a big effect on poverty among children and prime-age
adults. Reductions in wages at the bottom of the earnings distribution between 1979 and 1993
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eroded the living standards of a large and vulnerable population, just as real wage gains among
these families since 1995 have reversed some of the previous trend. Improvements in the social
safety net for these families were too small to offset the adverse effects of wage developments
from 1979 to 1993, although the recent expansion of the EITC has added greatly to the
effectiveness of United States anti-poverty policy (see also Scholz and Levine 2000).

Conclusion

The international comparisons in this paper contain important lessons for understanding
the high poverty rate in the United States. Clearly, both the wage distribution and the generosity
of social benefits strongly affect poverty. The relationship between low wages and poverty is
direct and obvious. Continued tight labor markets in the United States can help reduce poverty
as the wages received by less skilled workers are bid up. There are two important limits to this
effect, however. Not all of the poor can be expected to “earn” their way out of poverty. Single
parents with young children, disabled workers, and the unskilled will all face significant
challenges earning a comfortable income, no matter how low the unemployment rate falls.
A second, more uncertain limit on the benefits of low unemployment is the possibility of
a recession. In a future recession, declines in employment and hourly wages are likely to be
particularly severe for low-income breadwinners, boosting the poverty rate, especially among
children. Building a stronger safety net in anticipation of the next recession can significantly
improve the fortunes of low-wage breadwinners and their families. For example, many single
mothers have become breadwinners as a result of welfare reform. One consequence of reform is
that many single mothers who lose their jobs in the next recession will be ineligible for cash
public assistance and most will be ineligible for unemployment compensation. To prevent these
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mothers from falling into destitution, it may be necessary to create a new cash supplement or
public jobs program for unemployed parents, or to significantly strengthen the unemployment
compensation system as it applies to low wage workers.
The relationship between antipoverty spending and poverty rates is complicated, so the
simple correlations discussed in the previous section are at best suggestive. United States poverty
rates among children and the aged are high when compared with those in other industrialized
countries. Yet United States economic performance has also been outstanding compared with
that in other rich countries. Carefully crafted public policy can certainly reduce American
poverty. Implementing the policies that would achieve lower poverty rates would also have
costs. A higher unemployment rate and slower economic growth might be two of the indirect
effects of a more generous antipoverty policy. Of course, the direct and indirect costs of
antipoverty programs are now widely recognized (and frequently overstated) in public debate.
The wisdom of expanding programs targeted at children and poor families depends on one’s
values and subjective views about the economic, political, and moral tradeoffs of poverty
alleviation. For many critics of public spending on the poor, it also depends on a calculation of
the potential economic efficiency losses associated with a larger government budget. In the
strong American economy of the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, it hard to argue that the
United States cannot afford to do more to help the poor, particularly those who are working in
the labor market.
A partial solution to the poverty problem that is consistent with American values lies in
creating an income package that mixes work and benefits so that unskilled and semi-skilled
workers, including single parents, can support their families above the poverty level. Such a
package could include more generous earnings supplements under the EITC, refundable child
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and day care tax credits, and the public guarantee of assured child support for single parents with
an absent partner who cannot or will not provide income to their children. Targeted programs to
increase job access and skills for less skilled workers could also help meet the booming labor
demand in the United States economy. In the long run, a human capital strategy that focuses on
improving the education and marketable job skills of disadvantaged future workers, particularly
younger ones, is the approach likely to have the biggest payoff. If the nation is to be successful
in reducing poverty, it will need to do a better job of combining work and benefits targeted to
low-wage workers in low-income families (e.g., see Ellwood 2000; Danziger, Heflin, and
Corcoran 2000).
An expanded SSI program with a higher benefit guarantee for the aged and disabled who
also receive Social Security could go a long way toward reducing poverty among these groups to
levels that are common in northern Europe. Canada achieved a major reduction in poverty when
it implemented a targeted expansion of its social assistance plan in the 1980s (Smeeding and
Sullivan 1998).
A prolonged economic expansion and modest improvements in income supplements for
low-wage breadwinners (through the expansion of the EITC) have recently pushed the United
States poverty rate in the right direction. Given the political disposition of the American public,
a near 0 percent poverty rate is not a plausible goal. A gradual reduction in the overall poverty
rate to 8 percent using the 40 percent standard or the absolute United States poverty line, is
certainly feasible, however. Although this rate would represent a considerable achievement by
the standards of the United States, it is worth remembering that an 8 percent poverty rate is
higher than the rate in all but one of the 18 other countries we have considered here.
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1.

Poverty measurement began as an Anglo-American social indicator. In fact, “official”
measures of poverty (or measures of “low income” status) exist in very few nations. Only
the United States (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999) and the United Kingdom
(Department of Social Security 1996) have “official” poverty series. Statistics Canada
publishes the number of households with incomes below a “low income cutoff” on an
irregular basis, as does Australia. In Northern Europe and Scandinavia the debate centers
instead on the level of income at which minimum benefits for social programs should be
set. In other words, their concept of insufficient “low income” directly leads to
programmatic responses.

2.

See for UNICEF (2000), Bradbury and Jäntti (1999); for the United Nations (1998,
1999); for Förster (1993, 2000); for Eurostat (1998), Hagenaars, deVos, and Zaidi (1994);
and, for LIS, Jäntti and Danziger (2000), Smeeding (1997), Kim (2000), Kenworthy
(1998), and Smeeding, O’Higgins, and Rainwater (1990).
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3.

In 1998 the ratio of the United States (four-person) poverty line to median family income
was 35 percent while the ratio to median household income was 42 percent. Median
household income ($38,855) is far below median family income ($47,469) because single
persons living alone (or with others to whom they are not directly related) are both
numerous and have lower incomes than do families (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999a).
Families include all units with two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or
adoption; single persons (unrelated individuals) are excluded. In contrast, households
include all persons sharing common living arrangements, whether related or not,
including single persons living alone. Different adjustments for family or household size
might also make a difference in making such comparisons.

4.

The Penn World Tables Mark V purchasing power parities (PPPs) were judged to be
accurate and consistent for the early 1990s for all nations except Italy (Summers and
Heston 1991). However, they have not been updated, and now the OECD and World
Bank have developed their own sets of PPPs. We do not present comparisons of real
poverty rates over time due to the intertemporal inconsistency of PPPs dating back to the
mid-1980s and earlier. For additional comments on PPP’s and microdata-based
comparisons of well-being, see Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), Rainwater and
Smeeding (1999), Smeeding and Rainwater (2001), Smeeding et al. (2000), Castles
(1996), and Bradbury and Jäntti (1999, Appendix).
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5.

See Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995) for more on this income definition and its
robustness across nations. Note that the use of this “LIS” disposable income concept is
not unique to LIS alone. Eurostat and OECD have independently made comparisons of
income poverty and inequality across nations using identical or very similar measures of
net disposable income.

6.

This income definition differs from the broadest income definition used in the previous
chapter. The internationally comparable measure of income does not subtract workrelated expenses or medical care spending, and it does not include noncash benefits
provided in the form of public housing. The EITC and similar refundable tax credits and
noncash benefits such as food stamps and cash housing allowances are inc luded in this
income measure, however.

7.

Formally, adjusted disposable income (ADPI) is equal to unadjusted household income
(DPI) divided by household size (S) raised to an exponential value (e), ADPI = DPI/Se.
We assume the value of e is 0.5. To determine whether a household is poor under the
relative poverty measure, we compare its ADPI to 40 or 50 percent of the national
median ADPI. National median ADPI is calculated by converting all incomes into ADPI
and then taking the median of this “adjusted”income distribution. To determine whether
a household is poor under the absolute poverty measure, we first convert the official
United States poverty thresholds for different household sizes into appropriate national
currency units using PPP exchange rates, and then we compare each household’s DPI to
the appropriate threshold.

27

8.

We excluded Taiwan and the emerging nations of Central and Eastern Europe. We also
exclude Ireland because we currently have only one 1980s dataset for the nation. We
could not include New Zealand or Portugal because they are not members of LIS. We
include Japan based on an exhaustive set of data runs completed under LIS supervision in
1996.

9.

As LIS continues to add datasets, an even more complete picture of comparative national
poverty incidence will emerge. Recent studies of poverty using the LIS database include:
Bradbury and Jäntti (1999), Jäntti and Danziger (2000), Kenworthy (1998), Smeeding
(1997), Kim (2000), UNICEF (2000), and many others that can be found among the LIS
Working Papers on the LIS website (www.lis.ceps.lu).

10.

For the first time, we present LIS data on the Unified Germany for 1994. However, trend
data for Germany are still restricted to West Germany. The LIS West German poverty
rates tend to be 0.9 to 1.2 percentage points below those for all of Germany.

11.

Children are all persons under age 18; elderly are all persons age 65 or over. We do not
include racial or ethnic breakdown as only five LIS nations have such variables. The
poverty status of immigrants (foreign born citizens) can be studied in only four LIS
countries.
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12.

The base year is important because PPPs are reconfigured with a different “base” market
basket only every four to five years. Between base years, price indices are used to adjust
base baskets for comparisons. These price indices may differ from the consumer price
index (CPI) used to adjust poverty lines within and across countries. As the previous
chapter suggests, choice of CPI may affect the results. Hence, we stick with 1995 base
year PPPs adjusting back to 1994 PPPs using the implicit OECD price index.

13.

Smeeding et al. (1993) find that countries that spend more on cash social expenditures
also spend more on noncash subsidies. The largest differences between the United States
and other nations are in the realm of healthcare costs. United States citizens spend
roughly 15 percent of disposable incomes on health care compared to 5 percent in France,
2 percent in Canada, and 1 percent in the United Kingdom (LIS 2000a).

14.

While the arguments tend to suggest that United States absolute poverty rates may be
understated compared to those in other nations, some counter-arguments can also be
made. More than 85 percent of Americans are covered by health insurance. They do not
pay for most of the health care they consume out of the disposable income measured on
the CPS, though they do pay more for healthcare out-of-pocket on average (see note 12).
In other words, the average insured American does not pay the full “price” of medical
services reflected in OECD’s PPP estimates for the United States. For a large majority of
low-income Americans, insurance is provided for free through the Medicaid program or
at reduced cost under Medicare. For others, it is subsidized by an employer’s
contribution to a company-sponsored health plan. While low-income people in most, if
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not all, LIS nations pay lower net prices for medical care than do residents of the United
States, the United States probably has the highest final consumption prices for medical
care of all OECD countries. The OECD’s PPP estimates should therefore show the
United States has a high cost of living (at least for medical care). Second, Americans pay
more for higher education (though not for K-12 schooling) than citizens in other OECD
countries. Many Americans pay for college out of their disposable incomes. But
Americans with low income can obtain a decent college education about as cheaply as
most Europeans, so the difference in higher education costs may not be very relevant for
comparing poverty market baskets across countries. Third, more than one-quarter of lowincome Americans receive housing subsidies, either directly— through vouchers— or
indirectly— through below-market rents on publicly subsidized apartments. European
subsidies for housing vary by country, but are generally larger. Fourth, some
consumption items that are more important to poor families than to the non-poor are
dramatically cheaper in the United States than they are in other OECD countries. Food is
one such item. Because food consumption likely has a greater weight in the consumption
of the poor than it does in aggregate consumption, the OECD’s PPP exchange rates are
biased against the United States. In summary, while we could develop better PPP
exchange rates for purposes of comparing low-income families across OECD countries, it
is not obvious that a superior set of PPPs would reveal a systematically higher absolute
poverty rate in the United States and systematically lower rates in Europe. Hence, our
comparisons in Table 1 are about as good as any that could be done at this time.
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15.

We compared grossed-up LIS market incomes to OECD final domestic consumption
aggregates. The one nation which differed most from the rest was Italy, which captured
only about 47 percent of OECD gross final consumption in its LIS survey, compared to
86 percent for the United States. Most other nations were close to the United States
level; a few were above it.

16.

Underreporting of income has a large impact in comparing absolute poverty rates across
countries. The smaller the percentage of aggregate income that is reported in the
household survey, the higher the measured poverty rate. Underreporting may also affe ct
relative poverty comparisons if income at either the bottom or the top of the income
distribution is differentially underreported. Unfortunately, we cannot currently assess the
relative importance of income underreporting in different parts of the income distribution.

17.

See also Rainwater and Smeeding (2000) and Smeeding and Rainwater (2001). In order
to see where the countries with higher ratios of survey reported income to OECD
aggregate income than in the United States would be, we increased the poverty line from
43 percent of the United States 1994 median (the official poverty line) to 50 percent of
the United States median in each of these nations. Poverty rates in Finland, Norway, and
Sweden each rose by 2.7 to 3.8 percentage points, but still remained below the average
rate of 8.6 percent calculated at the bottom of Table 1 in each country. See Bradbury and
Jäntti (1999) for a similar result.
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18.

A lucid presentation and analysis of this viewpoint can be found in Okun (1975). See
also Welch (1999).

19.

While a similar type of comparison for poverty and inequality trends has been used by
Smeeding (1997) and Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), others have used different
poverty measures and different methods of assessing trends, e.g., Jäntti and Danziger
(2000). The results of all of these studies and methods were based on trends in poverty
rates measured at 50 percent of the median income, but they are also consistent with the
40-percent-of-median-based results in Table 3.

20.

Not all countries are included here. The ones that are included have been selected
because of their 1990s data and because they provide a broad picture of what is found in
other similar countries. A similar analysis of changes in domestic poverty is found in
Scholz and Levine (2001) (see also Smeeding and Ross 2001).

21.

In 1986, the 10th percentile point was 35 percent of the median; in 1991, 34 percent; in
1994, 36 percent, and in 1997, 38 percent— the same level as in 1979. See Atkinson,
Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995); Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), and Smeeding
(2000) for more on this point. These adjusted income distributions are all measured
using the same units, income definition, and equivalence scale as are used in this paper.

22.

The OECD reports on the prevalence of low wages for the early 1990s for 12 nations.
We added low-wage workers from Luxembourg and Norway based on LIS-based
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tabulations of wages. Estimates were not possible for the other nations (Italy,
Switzerland, Denmark, Israel, Spain) because neither LIS nor OECD had the requisite
data. Table A-2 contains the raw data for both low wages and social spending.

23.

A similar picture with an even stronger (0.57) correlation emerges for child poverty rates
(not shown). Overall poverty rates are highly correlated with low wages because
childless adults and the elderly are also more likely to be poor in low-wage countries.

24.

A similar diagram for overall poverty rates and overall social spending (including elderly
benefits) shows much the same result .
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Table 1.
Absolute Poverty Rates for OECD Nations in 1994 and 1995
Using the United States Poverty Line 1

Nation
Australia
United Kingdom
United States
France
Canada
Germany 2
Netherlands
Sweden
Finland
Norway
Luxembourg
Overall Average

(LIS Data Year)
(1994)
(1995)
(1994)
(1994)
(1994)
(1994)
(1994)
(1995)
(1995)
(1995)
(1994)

Poverty
Rate (%)
17.6
15.7
13.6
9.9
7.4
7.3
7.1
6.3
4.8
4.3
0.3
8.6

GDP Per Capita in 1995
Index4
Amount3
$21,459
77
18,743
67
27,895
100
20,192
72
22,951
82
21,357
77
21,222
76
19,949
72
18,861
68
23,316
84
36,570
131
$22,956

82.4

Notes: 1 Poverty is measured using the official US poverty line and equivalence scales. OECD
(1999) purchasing power parities are used to convert the US poverty line.
2
Includes all of Germany, including the eastern states of the former GDR.
3
Amount in 1995 US dollars using OECD Purchasing Power Parities.
4
Index with United States = 100.
Source: Authors' calculations from LIS, OECD (2001) and Smeeding and Rainwater (2001).

Table 2.
Poverty Rates in Nineteen Rich Countries, by Age Group, in the 1990s

Country
United States
Italy
Australia

Year
1997
1995
1994

Poverty rate (% of population) 1
2
Aged 3
Overall Children

Rank of country
2
Aged 3
Overall Children

10.7
8.9
7.0

14.7
14.1
7.4

12.0
4.7
12.2

1
2
3

1
2
5

2
5
1

Japan 4
Canada
United Kingdom
Israel
Spain
Netherlands
Sweden

1992
1994
1995
1992
1990
1994
1995

6.9
6.6
5.7
5.2
5.1
4.7
4.6

na
8.5
8.3
4.8
7.0
4.6
1.3

na
1.2
4.0
11.2
3.9
3.1
0.7

4
5
6
7
8
9
10

na
3
4
8
6
9
18

na
14
7
3
9
12
17

Germany 5
Switzerland
Denmark
France
Norway
Austria
Finland
Belgium
Luxembourg

1994
1992
1992
1994
1995
1992
1995
1992
1994

4.2
4.0
3.6
3.2
3.0
2.8
2.1
1.9
1.3

6.0
4.4
2.1
2.6
2.2
2.6
1.5
1.6
2.2

4.0
3.1
3.7
3.6
0.7
6.8
0.9
4.2
0.9

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

7
10
15
11
13
11
17
16
13

7
12
10
11
17
4
15
6
15

4.8

5.3

4.5

Overall Average
Notes:
1

Poverty is measured at 40% median adjusted disposable personal income (ADPI) for individuals. Incomes are adjusted by
E=0.5 where ADPI = unadjusted DPI divided by household size (S) to the power E: ADPI = DPI/sE.

2

Children are under age 18.
Adults aged 65 and over.
4
Japanese data runs were made for LIS by Professor Tsuneo Ishikawa.
5
Includes all of Germany, including the eastern states of the former GDR.
3

Source: Authors' tabulations of LIS files, except for Japan.

Table 3.
Trends in Poverty in Seventeen Rich Countries, by Age Group
Country

Years

Overall

Children

Aged

United States

1979-1997

0.7

1.5

-4.2

Italy

1986-1995

4.9

4.6

-0.6

Australia

1981-1994

1.8

0.5

6.0

Canada

1981-1994

-0.2

0.0

-5.3

United Kingdom

1979-1995

2.4

3.7

0.5

Israel

1978-1992

0.1

0.6

-2.3

Spain

1980-1990

-1.5

-0.5

-4.4

Netherlands

1983-1994

2.3

3.8

0.5

Sweden

1981-1995

1.7

-1.0

0.7

1984-1994

1.3

3.3

-0.6

Switzerland

1982-1992

1.5

4.1

-4.3

Denmark

1987-1992

-0.3

-0.2

-1.5

France

1979-1994

-0.8

-0.8

-3.5

Norway

1979-1995

0.5

0.1

-3.3

Finland

1987-1995

-0.4

0.2

-1.6

Belgium

1985-1992

-0.1

-0.3

-0.1

Luxembourg

1985-1994

-0.4

0.7

-2.8

Germany

1

Note: 1 Only West Germany is included here.
Source: Authors' calculations with LIS files based on 40 percent of median
poverty thresholds. Numbers show actual change in poverty rates at 40 percent of
median (in each year) calculated as the change from the initial year.

Table 4.
1

Household Poverty Rates by Income Source (household head aged 25 to 64)

Market
Country
Australia
Canada
Germany 3
Netherlands
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States

Year
1994
1994
1994
1991
1992
1995
1994

+ Universal

Income
Transfers
19.1
17.9
18.4
9.4
14.9
5.5
21.1
6.5
15.8
3.1
25.0
14.4
17.2
11.7

- Taxes
18.1
9.8
6.3
7.7
4.1
15.1
12.9

+ Social
Total Percentage
2
Assistance
Change
6.3
-67.0
6.9
-62.5
3.5
-76.5
3.6
-82.9
1.8
-88.6
5.9
-76.4
10.9
-36.6

Note: 1 Poverty rates are persons living in households with incomes below 40 percent of median adjusted
disposable income.
2
Refunds from the Earned Income Tax Credit (US) and the Family Tax Credit (UK) are treated as social
assistance.
3
Only West Germany is considered here.
Source: Smeeding and Ross (2001) Table A-2 and authors' calculations.

Figure 1. Relative Poverty Rates of Industrial
Nations in the 1990s
United States 1997
Italy 1995
Australia 1994
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Note: Poverty is measured as a percent of median adjusted disposable personal income (DPI) for individuals.
Incomes are adjusted by E=0.5 where adjusted DPI=actual DPI divided by household size (S) to the power E:
Adjusted DPI=DPI/SE.
Source: Authors' tabulations of LIS files; see Table A-1 for exact values.

Figure 2. Relationship of Low Pay and Poverty Rates in
Fourteen Industrialized Countries in the 1990s
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Source: OECD (1996) and authors' tabulations of the LIS data files. See Table A-2 for values.
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Figure 3. Relationship of Cash Social Expenditures and Child Poverty Rates in
Sixteen Industrialized Countries in the 1990s
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Source: OECD (1999) and authors' tabulations of the LIS data files; see Table A-2 for values. Cash and non-cash social expenditures
exclude health, education, and social services, but include all forms of cash benefits and near cash housing subsidies, active labor market
program subsidies and other contingent cash and other near cash benefits. Non-elderly benefits include only those accruing to household
head under age 65.
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Table A-1
Poverty Rates for All Persons, Children (Persons Under 18) and Elderly (Persons Over 65)

Country
United States
Italy
Australia
Canada
United Kingdom
Spain
Israel
Netherlands
Sweden
Germany
Switzerland
Denmark
France
Norway
Austria
Finland
Belgium
Luxembourg

Year
1997
1995
1994
1994
1995
1990
1992
1994
1992
1994
1992
1992
1994
1995
1992
1995
1992
1994

Overall Average

Country
United States
Italy
Canada
United Kingdom
Australia
Spain
Germany
Israel
Netherlands
Switzerland
France
Austria
Luxembourg
Norway
Denmark
Belgium
Finland
Sweden
Overall Average

All
40% Level of Poverty
Rate
Rank
10.7
1
8.9
2
7.0
3
6.6
4
5.7
5
5.2
6
5.2
6
4.7
8
4.6
9
4.2
10
4.0
11
3.6
12
3.2
13
3.0
14
2.8
15
2.1
16
1.9
17
1.3
18
4.7

Year
1997
1995
1994
1995
1994
1990
1994
1992
1994
1992
1994
1992
1994
1995
1992
1992
1995
1992

Children
40% Level of Poverty
Rate
Rank
14.7
1
14.1
2
8.5
3
8.3
4
7.4
5
7.0
6
6.0
7
4.8
8
4.6
9
4.4
10
2.6
11
2.6
11
2.2
13
2.2
13
2.1
15
1.6
16
1.5
17
1.3
18
5.3

Source: Authors' calculations from LIS database.

50% Level of Poverty
Rate
Rank
17.8
1
13.9
2
6.7
13
11.4
4
13.2
3
10.4
5
10.2
6
7.9
7
6.5
15
7.5
8
6.9
11
7.1
10
7.4
9
6.9
11
6.7
13
5
17
5.5
16
3.9
18
8.6

50% Level of Poverty
Rate
Rank
22.3
1
18.9
3
15.3
4
20.1
2
15.0
5
12.8
6
10.6
8
11.6
7
7.9
9
7.5
10
6.7
11
5.9
12
4.4
14
3.9
17
4.8
13
4.4
14
4.1
16
2.6
18
9.9

Country
Australia
United States
Israel
Austria
Italy
Belgium
United Kingdom
Germany
Spain
Denmark
France
Netherlands
Switzerland
Canada
Luxembourg
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Overall Average

Year
1994
1997
1992
1992
1995
1992
1995
1994
1990
1992
1994
1994
1992
1994
1994
1995
1995
1992

Elderly
40% Level of Poverty
Rate
Rank
12.2
1
12.0
2
11.2
3
6.8
4
4.7
5
4.2
6
4.0
7
4.0
7
3.9
9
3.7
10
3.6
11
3.1
12
3.1
12
1.2
14
0.9
15
0.9
15
0.7
17
0.7
17
4.5

50% Level of Poverty
Rate
Rank
28.9
1
20.7
2
17.2
4
17.4
3
12.4
7
11.9
8
13.9
6
7.0
13
11.4
9
11.1
10
10.2
11
6.2
15
7.4
12
4.7
17
6.7
14
5.1
16
14.5
5
2.6
18
11.6

Table A-2.
Low-Wage Workers and Social Transfers
(Data Source: Figures 2 and 3)

Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Israel
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg *
Netherlands
Norway *
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States

Year
1994
1992
1992
1994
1992
1995
1994
1994
1992
1995
1992
1994
1994
1995
1990
1995
1995
1997

Poverty Rate
All
Children
7.0
7.4
2.8
2.6
1.9
1.6
6.6
8.5
3.6
2.1
2.1
1.5
3.2
2.6
4.2
6.0
5.2
4.8
8.9
14.1
6.9
na
1.3
2.2
4.7
4.6
3.0
2.2
5.2
7.0
4.6
1.3
5.7
8.3
10.7
14.7

Percent of Country's GDP
Devoted to
Cash and
Cash and
Noncash
Noncash
Percent LowTotal Social
Non-Aged Social
Wage Workers *
Transfers **
Transfers **
13.8
9.3
6.2
13.2
18.6
8.9
7.2
19.3
12.1
23.2
12.5
8.0
na
18.9
12.4
5.9
23.3
15.3
13.3
21.0
10.7
13.3
18.4
8.4
na
na
na
na *
18.0
7.0
15.7
6.9
1.9
6.0 *
17.2
10.4
11.9
21.0
14.1
7.8 *
15.9
10.1
na
14.1
6.8
5.2
22.0
13.8
19.6
16.0
9.4
25.0
9.2
3.7

* Source: LIS database for Low Wages; rest OECD (1996). Italian OECD estimate is inconsistent with other
sources of Italian wage data.
** Source: OECD (1999a). Cash and non-cash social expenditures exclude health, education, and social
services, but include all forms of cash benefits and near cash housing subsidies, active labor market program
subsidies and other contingent cash and other near cash benefits. Non-elderly benefits include only those
accruing to household with head under age 65.

